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Abstract
The total funding envelope forWorld Bank projects is often divided among various state and non-state actors, each ofwhich
can have competing ideas about or interests in the project. How does the division of financing relate to overall project effec-
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transaction costs, and blurring lines of accountability. I combine original data on the number and concentration of finan-
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1. Introduction
Major foreign-financed development projects often in-
volve cooperation on the part of multiple actors. Many
projects involve initial negotiations between a donor and
a national government, followed by donor monitoring
of the project’s implementation by an agency of the
national government, subnational government entities,
private contractors, or non-governmental organizations
(Winters, 2010). For a given project, there can be multi-
ple implementers, responsible for different project com-
ponents, and the success of certain components might
depend on activities happening in other parts of the
project that are administered by different entities. Be-
yond a single foreign donor and an implementer, coop-
eration in a development project may include cofinanc-
ing bymultiple foreign and/or domestic sources. Inmany
cases, the reality of a development project is muchmore
complex that a straightforward principal-agent relation-
ship in which a single foreign donor provides funding to
an aid-receiving government for project implementation
by a single relevant ministry.
In this paper, I argue that involving more actors in
the design and implementation of development projects
risks less satisfactory outcomes. Having more actors
cooperating in a single development project increases
transaction costs, increases the likelihood of implemen-
tation delays, and reduces the clarity of lines of account-
ability within a project. Each of these problems risks un-
dermining development impact.
I explore this hypothesis using outcome ratings pro-
duced for World Bank projects by the World Bank’s In-
dependent Evaluations Group and data from Winters
and Streitfeld (2018) about the division of financing in
those projects. I find that the presence of multiple fi-
nancers correlates with slight decreases in the likelihood
of a project receiving a satisfactory rating. This is par-
ticularly true for the small number of projects that use
funding from non-governmental organizations in the aid-
receiving country. Other patterns related to particular
types of cofinancers are less robust.
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2. Project-Level Determinants of Aid Effectiveness
While the most common approach in the literature to
understanding aid effectiveness is to study the macroe-
conomic impacts of aid on growth (see Qian, 2015,
for a recent review), another stream of research stud-
ies project-level assessments of development outcomes,
trying to understand the characteristics of successful
projects and/or the contexts in which development
projects are most successful. In some of the earli-
est entries in this literature, scholars use cross-project
data to assess whether or not local participation in de-
velopment projects improves development outcomes
(Finsterbusch & Van Wicklin, 1987; Isham, Narayan, &
Pritchett, 1995). Other studies focus on how the political
or economic characteristics of aid-receiving countries af-
fect project success (Denizer, Kaufmann, & Kraay, 2013;
Dollar & Levin, 2005; Guillaumont & Laajaj, 2006; Isham
& Kaufmann, 1999; Isham, Kaufmann, & Pritchett, 1997),
although a key finding of Denizer et al. (2013) is that de-
velopment project success varies more within countries
than it does across countries. Some studies focus on par-
ticular actions taken by aid agencies in preparing projects
or during their implementation (Deininger, Squire, &
Basu, 1998; Denizer et al., 2013; Kilby, 2000, 2015). Re-
cent work has situated aid agencies within donor govern-
ments more broadly and argued that greater aid agency
autonomy leads to better development outcomes in chal-
lenging contexts (Honig, 2018, in press).
In an article that undertakes an analysis closely re-
lated to the one presented here, Shin, Kim and Sohn
(2017) analyze the relative performance of World Bank
projects implemented by the borrowing government
versus those implemented by non-governmental ac-
tors or by a combination of governmental and non-
governmental actors. Although the number of World
Bank projects implemented by non-governmental ac-
tors is small—only 29 out of the 647 projects that they
study—they consistently estimate that these projects
have better evaluation scores, controlling for the total
size and duration of the projects and the country, year,
and sector of their implementation. They additionally
find that the likelihood of having a positive project eval-
uation is increasing in the number of non-governmental
organizations involved in project implementation: a find-
ing that runs counter to the argument and evidence pre-
sented below.
3. The Challenges of Multiple Principals in
Development Projects
On the one hand, involving multiple actors in develop-
ment projects suggests the possibility of important ben-
efits. In terms of financing, the involvement of more ac-
tors can lead to a greater resource envelope, making it
plausible that a development project will be able to do
more of what it is supposed to do (e.g., build schools,
train bureaucrats, finance microlending). In addition, if
the counterfactual scenario to having multiple principals
collaborating on a single development project is that
the different development industry actors would under-
take separate, overlapping projects, then there should
be efficiency gains to be made by coordinating aid and
avoiding duplication (Acharya, Lima, & Moore, 2006). If
some of the actors that become involved in a develop-
ment project are local to the project sites, the existing
evidence suggests that this will improve project perfor-
mance (Isham et al., 1995).
On the other hand, expanding the set of actors
that are involved in designing and implementing a
single development project can raise challenges that
might prevent that development project from meeting
with success.
First, additional actors imply more transaction costs.
Project resources that could be spent on concrete out-
puts may instead be lost to mundane administrative
tasks because of the increased need for meetings and re-
porting. As Knack and Rahman (2007), drawing on the ob-
servations of VandeWalle and Johnston (1996), describe,
donors like to send expert missions, and those missions
like to meet with key government officials and obtain
comments for their reports. And different donors may
want information provided in specific formats. Citing a
World Bank press release, Knack and Rahman (2007) re-
fer to a survey in Bolivia sponsored by five different
donors, each of which had specific financial and techni-
cal reporting, “leading the government official assigned
to the project to spend nearly as much of her time meet-
ing these requirements as in undertaking the actual sur-
vey” (p. 178).
The friction association with increased transaction
costs may lead to suboptimal design or implementation
decisions. For instance, if multiple principals need to sign
off on changes to the project during implementation,
this likely means that project implementation will be less
flexible and less responsive to changing conditions on
the ground, mirroring the problems that Honig (2018,
in press) identifies when the headquarters office of aid
agencies exerts too much control.
Second, a project that is reliant on funding frommul-
tiple sources is more likely to encounter project delays.
A review ofWorld Bank Implementation Completion and
Results Reports reveals that funding committed by gov-
ernment entities in aid-receiving countries often does
not arrive, delaying project implementation and creat-
ing new transaction costs related to reallocating budgets
or finding substitute financing (Winters, 2014). Entire
project componentsmay be dropped if one of the project
funders proves unable to provide financing, and this
may have knock-on effects for other project components
that were supposed to build on the now-eliminated one.
Once again, end-of-project reviews make clear that the
delay or absence of counterpart funds is often blamed
for project shortcomings (Winters, 2014).
Third, having multiple actors involved in develop-
ment project implementation may reduce the clarity of
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the lines of accountability within the project. It can be-
come less clear to whom contractors and subcontrac-
tors are responsible and to whom project beneficiaries
should report a concern about project implementation.
If different project beneficiaries identify different actors
as being in charge of the project, this may lead to re-
ports of problems or other information not being aggre-
gated in such away that project principals can take action.
The literature already identifies a “broken feedback loop”
(Martens, 2002; see also Winters, 2010) in which project
beneficiaries face great challenges in making their voices
heard by aid donors; having multiple donors at play in a
project may exacerbate this issue.
At the macro-level, the problems of having many
donors operating in a single aid-receiving country have
been studied in the literature on aid fragmentation,
which typically associates more donors in a country
with less positive economic or institutional outcomes
(e.g., Djankov, Montalvo, & Reynal-Querol, 2009; Kimura,
Mori, & Sawada, 2012; Knack & Rahman, 2007). Some
of the most recent literature in this field suggests that
more donors are not necessarily problematic for macro-
level outcomes—a finding that may carry over to the cur-
rent project-level study. Ziaja (in press), for instance, ar-
gues that fragmented democracy aid can be useful for
the institutionalization of democracy because it presents
a “marketplace of ideas” from which the aid-receiving
country can draw. As compared to the argument above
about multiple principals leading to friction that drives
suboptimal decisions, this frameworkwould suggest that
more entities involved in an aid project may bring more
ideas that can help increase the efficiency of the project.
Gehring, Michaelowa, Dreher and Spörri (2017) argue
that donor fragmentation will be less problematic to
the extent that donors are willing to coordinate. At the
project level, if there is substantial coordination, there
is the possibility of minimizing transaction costs, delays,
and unclear accountability chains.
4. Research Design
To study how complexity in project financing relates to
project outcome ratings, I combine together informa-
tion about financing in World Bank projects with project-
specific outcome ratings. I use simple linear models and
build on existing analyses in the literature. In the absence
of an instrument predicting exogenous variation in the
complexity of project financing, my findings should be
understood as correlational and preliminary.
By “World Bank project,” I refer to investment
projects financed by the World Bank’s two main lend-
ing arms, the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), which lends at near-market rates
tomiddle-income countries, and the International Devel-
opment Association (IDA), which provides concessional
loans or grants to the world’s poorest countries. In a
small number of cases—known as “blend” projects—the
financing comes from both the IBRD and the IDA. As de-
velopment policy lending (formerly known as structural
adjustment lending) does not include cofinancing, that
type ofWorld Bank lending is not included in the analysis.
World Bank projects are designedbyWorld Bank staff
in collaboration with officials from the borrowing coun-
try. Unlike some other forms of foreign assistance, where
the funding is provided to non-state actors—i.e., “bypass
aid” (Dietrich, 2013)—World Bank assistance flows di-
rectly to themember governments that borrow from the
Bank. Where there is cofinancing from other donors, it is
likely that those other donors also have been involved in
the design of the project. On the other hand, as detailed
inWinters and Streitfeld (2018), cofinancing fromwithin-
country sources may be something that the government
agrees to secure without actually incorporating the cofi-
nancing entity into conversations about project design.
4.1. Operationalizing Development Project Funding
Complexity
In order to study the extent to which having more prin-
cipals involved in a development project correlates with
project success or failure, I use data from Winters and
Streitfeld’s (2018) study of counterpart funding in World
Bank projects. This data describes the number of entities
making financial commitments to particular World Bank
projects at the time of project approval.
The data in Winters and Streitfeld (2018) was col-
lected in two waves from the World Bank Projects
Database. Originally, the authors hand-coded the financ-
ing in 2,631 World Bank (IBRD/IDA) investment projects
that were approved in the 2000–2010 period using the fi-
nancing tables found in the Project Appraisal Document
(PAD) or other publicly available documents. Later, the
authors webscraped the “financing tab” of the World
Bank Projects Database for 1,676 projects listed as hav-
ing been approved during the 2011–2017 period.
The authors then recoded the funding information
into a set of 13 categories reflecting different within-
borrower entities and a set of 32 codes reflecting ei-
ther specific (e.g., “United Kingdom”) or generic (e.g.,
“Unidentified Bilteral Donors”) international sources. In
doing so, the authors collapsed together some informa-
tion. Specifically, for the international codes, funding
from any of the World Bank-administered trust funds
was included in a general trust fund category; funding
from the regional development banks was included in a
generic regional fund category; and funding from other
multilateral lenders was included in a generic multilat-
eral donor category. In some cases, it may be possible
that the collapsing of information has led to multiple
funders being combined together in a single category.
There also are generic local and international categories
for cases where the documentation did not precisely
identify the source of financing. The finance coding cate-
gories are listed in Table 1.
I use this underlying data to create a series of explana-
tory variables meant to proxy for project complexity in
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Table 1. Coding categories for funding in World Bank projects.
Domestic Financing Categories
Borrower Local Communities
Borrowing Agency Local Farmer Organizations
Borrowing Country’s Financial Intermediaries (Unidentified) Local Sources of Borrowing Country
Local Governments of Borrowing Country Private Sector
Municipalities of Borrowing Country Sub-Borrowers
NGOs of Borrowing Country (Unidentified) Others
Local Beneficiaries
International Financers
Australia The Netherlands
Austria New Zealand
Belgium Norway
(Unidentified) Bilateral Donor(s) Private Sources
Canada Regional Fund
Denmark Russia
European Union Saudi Arabia
Finland South Africa
France Spain
Germany St. Kitts and Nevis
Ireland Sweden
Italy Switzerland
Japan Trust Fund
Korea Unidentified International Source
Kuwait United Kingdom
Multilateral Fund United States
Note: Categories are developed in Winters and Streitfeld (2018).
terms of the number of different principals involved in
project design and implementation. First, I create a series
of indicator variables for whether there was cofinancing
from (1) any government entity on the borrower side, (2)
any community-level entity on the borrower side, (3) any
non-government organization in the borrower country,
and (4) any foreign donor besides the World Bank. Sec-
ond, I create a variable that counts the number of non-
World Bank sources of financing in each project. In the
data, 13 percent of projects feature only World Bank
funding; 51 percent involve funding from theWorld Bank
and one other source; and 36 percent involve funding
from two or more sources in addition to the World Bank.
Third, I create a Hirschman-Herfindahl concentration in-
dex in which I sum the squared financing shares of all
categories of entities contributing to the project. Higher
values of this variable indicate that a small number of fi-
nancing entities provide the majority of project financ-
ing; when all funding comes from the World Bank, this
index takes the value 1.
4.2. Measuring Project Success
As with a number of previous studies of project-level
aid effectiveness, I take the outcome variable from the
World Bank Internal Evaluation Group’s Project Perfor-
mance Ratings dataset (World Bank, 2011). I down-
loaded the version of the data dated 26 July 20181. This
data includes ratings from World Bank project assess-
ments conducted by the Independent Evaluation Group
(IEG) and is described in Independent Evaluation Group
(2015). In line with previous studies, I use the “overall
project outcome” variable from the dataset for my out-
come variable.
I use the most recent assessment available in the
data. For most projects, this is the overall project out-
come rating found in IEG’s review of the Implementation
Completion Results (ICR) report submitted by the project
team to IEG.Note that this document, knownas either an
Evaluation Summary or an ICR Review, is prepared by IEG
staff based on the review of the project previously com-
pleted by operational staff. In an ICR Review, IEG staff
base their review of the project on the criteria stated in
the ICR, and they have the ability to overrule the rating
provided by the operational staff in the ICR.
In addition to ICR Reviews, IEG undertakes in-depth,
field-based project reviews for a small subset of projects,
releasing a Project Performance Assessment Report
(PPAR) based on original data collection about project
performance. For 10 percent of the cases in the data, the
PPAR rating supersedes the ICR Review rating.
The ratings are on a six-point scale: highly unsatis-
factory, unsatisfactory, moderately unsatisfactory, mod-
erately satisfactory, satisfactory, and highly satisfactory.
1 https://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/sites/default/files/Data/Data/MasterDataFile20180726.xlsx
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Themodal category in the data ismoderately satisfactory
(44 percent of projects). Slightly more than one-in-four
projects (28 percent) is given one of the three unsatis-
factory ratings with more than half of those being the
mildest of the three. The highly satisfactory rating is re-
served for only a few projects (2.2 percent). Because of
the limited use of the extreme categories on the six-point
scale, I also study an indicator variable that distinguishes
between projects receiving any one of the three satisfac-
tory ratings and projects receiving any one of the three
unsatisfactory ratings.
I present summary statistics for both the outcome
and explanatory variable in Table 2.
4.3. Specification
I use a linear model to study the relationship between
the measures of project complexity and the project out-
come ratings. Although I lack a source of exogenous vari-
ation in financing complexity thatwould help identify the
causal effects of having more financing entities involved
in a project, I control for somepotential confounding vari-
ables. I control for the total project size to avoid intro-
ducing a potential spurious correlation in which larger
projects are both more likely to involve more funding en-
tities and more or less likely to be rated as satisfactory.
I also control for sector fixed effects for similar reasons
(i.e., that projects in certain sectors may be more or less
likely to involve multiple actors and more or less likely
to be rated as satisfactory). I include fixed effects for the
year of the evaluation to account for changing standards
within IEG over time that may also vary with temporal
trends in the prevalence of cofinancing. I include indica-
tor variables forwhether the project funding comes from
the IBRD, the IDA, or both (with IDA, the modal category
in the data being the omitted category) in case there is
a propensity for greater cofinancing in one branch of the
Bank or the other and also a propensity for differential
kinds of evaluations. The data include projects financed
under eight different World Bank financing mechanisms:
Adaptable Program Loans, Emergency Recovery Loans,
Financial Intermediary Loans, Investment Project Financ-
ing, Learning and Innovation Loans, Sector Investment
and Maintenance Loans, Specific Investment Loans, and
Technical Assistance Loans. Once again, given the possi-
bility of variation in the likelihood of cofinancers and vari-
ation in the baseline likelihood of a satisfactory project
across types of financing, I include a set of lending in-
strument fixed effects. I include an indicator variable for
the type of evaluation on the grounds that PPARs may
be more likely for more complex projects and also more
likely to return harsher project ratings. Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, I include country fixed effects to
account for the possibility that certain countries may be
more likely to have projects involvingmore or fewer part-
ners and (for plausibly distinct reasons) may be more
or less likely to have successful or unsuccessful projects.
The point estimates on the project-level variables of
interest are therefore based on within-country, within-
year, within-sector, and within-lending-instrument varia-
tion in project complexity and project outcomes. I cluster
the standard errors on country.
5. Results
Table 3 presents the results. Columns (1) through (4) use
the six-point evaluation ratings scale as the outcome and
columns (5) through (8) use the dichotomized outcome
variable. According to the results in columns (1) and (5),
the within-country variation in whether or not World
Bank projects involve cofinancing is such that the pres-
ence of any non-World Bank funding in a project nega-
tively predicts project outcome ratings. The effect sizes,
however, are modest. The presence of cofinancing re-
duces the project rating only by 0.16 points on the six-
point scale or, alternatively, the likelihood of the project
being rated satisfactory falls by seven percentage points
(against a baseline likelihood of 72 percent that a project
will have a satisfactory rating).
In columns (2) and (6), I break down the presence
of cofinancing by including a set of indicator variables
for the different types of actors that might provide fund-
ing to the project: any government entity from the bor-
rowing country, any local-level entity, any domestic NGO,
and any other external donors. In column (2), the in-
volvement of local government entities in financing the
Table 2. Summary statistics.
N Mean SD Min Max
IEG Rating (Six-Point Scale) 2024 3.91 1.01 1 6
IEG Rating (0/1) 2024 0.72 0.45 0 1
Cofinancing (0/1) 2024 0.87 0.33 0 1
Borrower Gov’t (0/1) 2024 0.83 0.38 0 1
Community/Local (0/1) 2024 0.12 0.33 0 1
Domestic NGO (0/1) 2024 0.00 0.07 0 1
Other Donors (0/1) 2024 0.29 0.46 0 1
Count of Cofinancers 2024 1.48 1.14 0 8
Concentration of Financing 2024 0.67 0.20 0.14 1
Log (Project Size) 2024 4.00 1.43 0.26 10.20
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 117–126 121
Table 3. Effect of project funding complexity on development project outcomes.
	 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome: Six-Point Satisfaction Scale Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory
Any Cofinancing (0/1) −0.16** −0.07*
(0.08) (0.04)
Borrower Gov’t (0/1) −0.11 −0.04
(0.08) (0.04)
Community/Local (0/1) 0.14** 0.05
(0.07) (0.04)
Domestic NGO (0/1) −0.51 −0.43**
(0.33) (0.18)
Other Donors (0/1) −0.04 −0.01
(0.05) (0.02)
Count of Cofinancers −0.00 −0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Concentration of Financing 0.23 0.15**
(0.14) (0.06)
Log(Project Size) 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 2,024 2,024 2,024 2,024 2,024 2,024 2,024 2,024
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
Notes: All models are linear regression models that include indicators for IBRD and blend funding, an indicator for PPAR ratings, and
country, year, sector, and lending instrument fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. * p < 0.10;
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
project correlates with worse performance ratings (al-
though not significantly so), whereas the presence of
funding from community organizations correlates with
better performance ratings, conditional on the other vari-
ables in the model. The signs of these variables remain
consistent in column (6), but the uncertainty in their es-
timation increases. There is a large and negative coef-
ficient in column (2) on the indicator for the presence
of funding from a domestic NGO in the project; in col-
umn (6), with the dichotomized outcome, this effect be-
comes statistically significant at conventional levels. Ac-
cording to column (6), the presence of funding from a do-
mestic NGOdecreases the probability of a project getting
a satisfactory rating by a striking 43 percentage points.
There are only 10 projects in all of the data, however,
where domestic NGOs provide funding. Given the nu-
merous fixed effects in the model, this estimate may be
based on the performance of an even smaller number of
projects. The presence of foreign donors other than the
World Bank does not significantly correlate with project
performance in either column (2) or column (6); this vari-
able produces coefficient estimates close to zero. Remov-
ing the indicators other than for the borrower govern-
ment from themodel and comparing those projects with
borrower government involvement to all other projects
produces coefficient estimates that are approximately
the same magnitude and significance as those in Table 3
(results not reported).
In columns (3) and (7), the coefficient on the raw
count of the number of actors providing funding to the
project is negative but small in magnitude and not sta-
tistically significant. In columns (4) and (8), on the other
hand, the concentration of project funding as measured
by the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index is a positive predic-
tor of project success (and a statistically significant one
for the dichotomous outcome): where project funding
is more concentrated, we can expect to see more satis-
factory project outcomes. This variable ranges from 0.14
to 1.0 with a standard deviation of 0.2. The substantive
effect of a one standard deviation change in the con-
centration of funding is therefore relatively small: a one
standard deviation increase in the concentration of fund-
ing correlates only with a 0.05 point increase on the six-
point satisfaction scale or a 3.0 percentage point increase
in the probability of any kind of satisfactory rating, con-
ditional on the other variables in the model. Although
small, the result is consistent with the result presented in
columns (1) and (5) that overall project ratings are lower,
ceteris paribus, in the presence of cofinancing.
In all of the regressions reported in Table 3, total
project size is a positive predictor of the project rat-
ings. Denizer et al. (2013) find the opposite result, that
larger projects receive less positive ratings, whereas Shin
et al. (2017) report a similar finding as here, that larger
projects aremore highly rated. Denizer et al. (2013) study
a much larger set of projects, going further back in his-
tory, whereas Shin et al. (2017) study projects from a
time period similar to the one studied here. Therefore,
this may be an association that has changed over time.
Looking only at the bivariate correlation between log to-
tal project size and the IEG rating, the correlation is posi-
tive and highly significant.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, Pages 117–126 122
For some of the indicator variables used in Table 3,
some of the categories indicating the presence or ab-
sence of a particular type of actor mask the fact that
multiple entities from that category were involved in the
project. For instance, of the 1,688 projects in the data
involving a domestic government actor, 79 of those in-
volve multiple government actors. Likewise, of the 553
projects that involve financing fromother foreign donors,
129 involve financing from two other donors; 49 involve
financing from three other donors; and 30 involve financ-
ing from four other donors. In Table 4, therefore, I re-
place the 0/1 indicators for these types of financing with
count variables for the number of financing entities un-
der each of these categories. Column (1) uses the six-
point scale as the outcome, while column (2) uses the
satisfactory/unsatisfactory distinction.
The results in Table 4 largely follow those in Table 3.
Using the six-point scale, we see a marginally signifi-
cant positive correlation between community funding
and project success; although we see a negative corre-
lation between the count of domestic government agen-
cies contributing to the project and the project outcome,
it is not statistically significant (as compared to the bi-
nary predictor in column (1) of Table 3). Using the di-
chotomous satisfactory versus unsatisfactory outcome,
the presence of a domestic NGO remains a large and sig-
nificant negative predictor of project success, and none
of the other funding source variables are significant.
5.1. Project Delay Mechanism
As described above, cofinancing frequently is delayed,
and project evaluations frequently complain about this
delay in cofinancing and attribute problems in the
project to the delay. Although it is challenging to find
proxies for the transaction cost mechanism or the ac-
countability mechanism described above, I can look for
evidence of the project delaymechanism by studying the
relationship between cofinancing and project length.
In column (1) of Table 5, I regress project duration
(closing date minus approval date) on cofinancing, total
project size, and the set of indicator variables for coun-
try, year, and project characteristics included in the main
specification above. The results show that cofinancing
Table 4. Effect of project funding complexity on development project outcomes (additional count variables).
(1) (2)
Outcome Six-Point Satisfaction Scale Satisfactory/Unsatisfactory
Count of Borrower Government −0.05 −0.01
(0.07) (0.03)
Community/Local (0/1) 0.14** 0.05
(0.07) (0.04)
Domestic NGO (0/1) −0.51 −0.42**
(0.34) (0.18)
Count of Other Donors −0.03 −0.01
(0.03) (0.01)
Log (Project Size) 0.10*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.01)
Observations 2,024 2,024
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.06
Notes: All models are linear regression models that include indicators for IBRD and blend funding, an indicator for PPAR ratings, and
country, year, sector, and lending instrument fixed effects. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
Table 5. Project funding complexity, project duration, and project ratings.
	 (1) (2)
Outcome Project Duration (Years) Six-Point Satisfaction Scale
Any Cofinancing (0/1) 1.35*** −0.18**
(0.13) (0.09)
Project Duration (Years) −0.02
(0.02)
Log (Project Size) −0.03 0.11***
(0.05) (0.02)
Observations 2,019 2,019
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.11
Notes: both models are linear regression models that include indicators for IBRD and blend funding, an indicator for PPAR ratings, and
country, year, sector, and lending instrument fixed effects. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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clearly leads to project delays. Controlling for project
size, the presence of cofinancing is associated with an in-
creased project duration of 1.35 years.
Longer projects, however, do not imply worse ratings.
Column (2) shows that the measure of project duration
is not significantly associated with project outcome rat-
ings when we add it to the specification from column (1)
of Table 3. The coefficient on cofinancing is of the same
magnitude as above and remains statistically significant.
Therefore, insofar as we are finding evidence that cofi-
nancing negatively affects project ratings, the pathway
does not seem to be through simply extending the dura-
tion of a project.
5.2. Additional Analyses
As described above, the main estimating equation con-
trols for various project characteristics, such as the arm
of the World Bank providing the lending and the spe-
cific category of loan. In addition, the evaluation data
comes from two types of evaluations: the more super-
ficial ICR Reviews and the field-based PPARs. In Table 6,
I use these project and evaluation characteristics to sub-
set the data and study the correlation between cofinanc-
ing and project ratings across various types of projects.
Columns (1) and (2) look at projects where theWorld
Bank funding included in the project comes from ei-
ther the IBRD or the IDA. (“Blend” projects that include
funding from both are not reported because of their
small number.) In both IBRD and IDA projects, the pres-
ence of cofinancing negatively correlateswith project rat-
ings, conditional on the other variables included in the
model. The relationship is only statistically significant for
IDA projects, but the two coefficients are not statisti-
cally distinguishable.
In column (3), I look only at specific investment
projects. For these projects, the negative relationship be-
tween cofinancing and project ratings is reduced in mag-
nitude and does not achieve conventional levels of statis-
tical significance. Conversely, across the remaining types
of World Bank lending, the relationship is larger and es-
timated more precisely than the overall relationship re-
ported in Table 3. Column (6) suggests that cofinancing
may be particularly deleterious in Emergency Recovery
Loans: the coefficient indicates that the presence of co-
financing in these loans is associated with a project rat-
ing that is over half a point less than those found in oth-
erwise similar Emergency Recovery Loans without cofi-
nancing. The estimate in column (7) is far from statistical
significance, but it provides some evidence that Techni-
cal Assistance Loans might receive higher project ratings
when there is cofinancing. Thiswouldmake sense, as gov-
ernment cofinancingmight truly be a sign of government
buy-in in these projects.
Columns (8) and (9) look to see if the results change
when we subset the data to only the desk-based ICR
Reviews or the field-based PPARs. The coefficients are
indistinguishable, although given the relatively smaller
number of PPARs, there is much more uncertainty in
the estimate when we only use projects with that kind
of evaluation.
Overall, these results reinforce the patterns identified
in Table 3, although they suggest that problems brought
about by cofinancing might be particularly deleterious in
Emergency Recovery Loans and that cofinancing might
actually be beneficial in Technical Assistance Loans.
6. Conclusions
I study whether or not multiple financing sources in
World Bank projects are associated with undesirable
project outcomes, combining data on project cofinancing
with the IEG Project Ratings Database that has been used
in previous work. I hypothesize that a diversity of fund-
ing flows may correlate with less satisfactory project per-
formance because of friction associated with increased
transaction costs, the possibility of delayed implemen-
tation, and the issue of blurred lines of accountability.
Overall, I find indications in favor of the theory: World
Bank projects with any cofinancing and with less concen-
trated financing receive less positive evaluations. The es-
timated correlations, however, are generally small in size,
conditioning on other project characteristics and using
country and year fixed effects.
Table 6. Project complexity and project ratings within subsets of projects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specific All Other Adaptable Emergency Technical
IBRD IDA Investment Types of Program Recovery Assistance
Subset Projects Projects Loans Loans Loans Loans Loans ICRRs PARs
Any Cof. −0.20 −0.17* −0.12 −0.29*** −0.15 −0.64** 0.28 −0.19** −0.19
(0/1) (0.23) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.28) (0.31) (0.56) (0.08) (0.55)
N 734 1,236 1,244 780 302 154 179 1,828 196
Adj. R2 0.28 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.45 0.75 0.60 0.21 0.51
Notes: all models are linear regression models that include log(total project size) and country, year, and sector fixed effects. Columns (1)
and (2) include an indicator for PPAR ratings and lending instrument fixed effects. Columns (3) through (7) include indicators for IBRD
and blend funding and an indicator for PPAR ratings. Columns (8) and (9) include indicators for IBRD and blend funding and lending
instrument fixed effects. * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
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When I try to identify if cofinancing streams from spe-
cific types of partners are particularly problematic, I find
some evidence that local-level participation may lead to
better project performance, a result that is in line with
the existing literature (Isham et al., 1995). The partial
correlation, however, is estimated with a fair amount of
uncertainty, depending on the outcome variable, and is
small in magnitude.
When local NGOs provide financing, however, I iden-
tify a large, negative correlation with project satisfaction
ratings, which is significant for one of the two outcome
measures. This finding contrasts with Shin et al.’s (2017)
finding that World Bank projects with non-government
implementers receive higher project ratings than those
that are implemented by a government agency. In both
that article and this one, the number of observations that
includeNGO involvement is small, such that itmay be the
case that a few good or bad projects drive the results.
I was not able to obtain replication data from the Shin
et al. (2017) article to explore the overlap in the projects
that we are studying or our coding of NGO participation.
While I look at whether or not domestic NGOs make a fi-
nancial contribution to the project, they ostensibly iden-
tify World Bank-funded projects that are implemented
by NGOs.
The study of project-level outcomes remains cru-
cial for the overall study of aid effectiveness. Whereas
overall aid flows result from a variety of geopolitical
and domestic political processes—giving development-
oriented practitioners less control, project-level design
decisions are typically made by bureaucratic agents with
sincere interests in development (Iannantuoni, Waeiss,
&Winters, 2018; Winters & Streitfeld, 2018). Continuing
to build up our knowledge about which project design
elements facilitate development impact is an important
endeavor for concretely making aid more effective.
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